New forms of more complex conflict




Demographics of Tamil nationalism


Kumar David Writes
(Mawbima article 2008-10-11 based on the e-mail file sent to Place.names by A. K. David., 11. July. 2010)

It takes a while for political analysts to incorporate the subtle but deep influences that gradual changes have on social conflict although they maybe aware of the bald facts. The initial emigration of Tamils overseas, followed by a flood post-1983 is well documented. Southward domestic migration, initially gradual and lubricated by economic opportunity, and later accelerated by the ravages of war, is also well known though statistics may be contentious - are there more "Ceylon Tamils" in the South or the North-East? However, what has been less worked out is the political implication of these demographic changes. Is Thamil Eelam of less interest to Tamils than previously? Will support and recruitment into the LTTE decline due to demographic factors, leaving aside other reasons? Has the national question itself been transformed? This article takes a quick look at some of these issues.

Categories of Tamils

Sivaguru Ganesan, a comrade from engineering faculty student days, partitions the Tamil community along two axes; the class and the geographic. His demographic partition proposes the following categories - North and East (there is some distinction between them), Colombo (meaning domiciled in the South) and the diaspora. The Tamils of the Jaffna peninsula and the Wanni share a common ideological orientation towards the LTTE. The willingness of Wanni Tamils to follow the LTTE into the wilderness indicates that despite the ravages of war, Northern Tamils are willing to choose the LTTE over the Sinhala state.

However, partly due to war weariness, and partly what Brian Seneviratne calls the congeniital meekness of the Tamil psyche, this will never amount a people's uprising - there will never be a Warsaw Ghetto uprising in Jaffna. The anger of the Tamils with the Sinhala state, though very real, will always remain muted; the Tamil is easier to domesticate and discipline. The rise of the LTTE in the shape of a militarist alternative is precisely the dialectical response, the antithesis, the rejection, that this state of affairs gave rise to.

The LTTE could not have got away with this hegemony of the military over the political if the Tamil population was politically bold and assertive. The retiring character of the people, rooted in social primitivism (caste), an undeveloped economic and class structure, ideological backwardness (as Professor Ganesan is wont to say) and the absence of radical politics, except in the exception - the militant youth movements, "the boys". But this inversion of the political and military dimensions has, historically, been costly for the wellbeing of Tamil nationalism.

The long term evolution of the relationship between the Eastern Tamils and the TMVP is moot. Many people are willing to do a deal with the state due to war weariness and declining confidence in the armed struggle. My hunch, however, is that eventually quislings will be marginalised sans constitutional reform (a high degree of autonomy) and a solution to the land question, neither possible for the Rajapaksa regime. That is, a client TMVP will decay in time to no more than a Douglas type brigade.

The Tamil diaspora is the most interesting sector of the Tamil community. It is solidly pro-LTTE, it has enormous financial clout and political influence, and it is numerous in crucial Western countries. It is virulent in its militancy; that is, it is willing to fight to the death of the last Tamil domiciled in the island. I do not intend to mock; what I mean is that I cannot see an “Expatriate Tamil Brigade, like the world Jewish community which stormed Palestine after World War I, or the Jihadists who are flocking to Afghanistan, landing on the shores of the Wanni. Indeed if the diaspora was willing to put its children where its money and mouth is, the ballgame will stand globally transformed; but that won't happen, for sure. Nevertheless, the Tamil diaspora, safely ensconced overseas, can drive the nationalist movement forward for decades, irrespective of the outcome of today's military campaigns.

Prospects for Tamil nationalism

Several erstwhile radicals are on the run; they proclaim the dawn of millennial happiness after pulverising the LTTE. Professor N A de S Amaratunga, in an otherwise lacklustre article, mocks Victor Ivan and speculates, "I hope it is not the changing horizons in relation to LTTE invincibility that has made him shift his position" (Sunday Island, 5 October); but I suspect that this is indeed the case. I am not expert enough to say whether the LTTE will suffer a knockout blow or eventually tie the military up in knots; I am buffeted by a variety of analysis from many quarters that I do not have the background expertise to sift through. Obviously if the LTTE strikes back effectively, Tamil nationalism will ride high again and changes will accelerate in the southern polity. Will the Rajapaksa regime go kaput at the hands of its own people? Nevertheless, for the time being, I am willing to go along with a compromise view that the LTTE is not invincible, but will not be entirely vanquished either. The important issue, then, is how Tamil nationalism will evolve if this assumption is correct - the alternative I will explore in another article at a later date. The quick answer is that there will be a period of depression and disillusionment followed by the eruption of new politico-military struggles. I envisage a much bigger role for Southern Tamils in alliance with radical Sinhalese; the process will take a year or two to mature but Southern Tamils will come out of their shell since the regime is politically bankrupt. Faster reactions will be in the diaspora and in South India; a prominent role in Tamil nationalism will accrue to the diaspora, and it will be effective.
Ah, but my compromise assumption maybe wrong. I do not think we will know in a few weeks, the process that is unfolding will remain complicated for years.